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Abstract
A popular sentiment is that fairness is inexorably subjective and incapable of being
determined by objective standards. This study, on the other hand, seeks to establish evidence on
unbiased justice and to propose and demonstrate a general approach for measuring impartial
views empirically. Most normative justice theories associate impartiality with limited
information and with consensus, i.e., a high level of agreement about what is right. In both the
normative and positive literature, information is usually seen as the raw material for self-serving
bias and disagreement. In contrast, this paper proposes a type of impartiality that is associated
with a high level of information. The crucial distinction is the emphasis here on the views of
impartial spectators, rather than implicated stakeholders. I describe the quasi-spectator method,
i.e., an empirical means to approximate the views of impartial spectators that is based on a direct
relationship between information and consensus, whereby consensus refers to the level of
agreement among actual evaluators of real world situations. Results of surveys provide evidence
on quasi-spectator views and support this approach as a means to elicit moral preferences. By
establishing a relationship between consensus and impartiality, this paper seeks to help lay an
empirical foundation for welfare analysis, social choice theory and practical policy applications.
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“There is no objective standard of ‘fairness.’ ‘Fairness’ is strictly in the eye of the
beholder… To a producer or seller, a ‘fair’ price is a high price. To the buyer or
consumer, a ‘fair’ price is a low price. How is the conflict to be adjudicated?”
– Milton Friedman, Newsweek, July 4, 1977.
The central concern of most normative economics is the distribution of benefits
and burdens among members of society, i.e., distributive justice. The large volume of
relatively recent empirical research on justice (or fairness) has demonstrated the
importance of this value for economic decision-making in both the laboratory and the
field, e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004, 2005) and Blinder and Choi (1990).
Contraposed to these facts, however, is the sceptical position that, at best, views of
fairness are inexorably biased, or that, at worst, fairness is a vacuous construct employed
opportunistically. The popular belief expressed in the quote above that “fairness is in the
eye of the beholder” is one that justice researchers frequently encounter in dealing both
with the general public and with some academic colleagues. The abandon with which
people wield fairness arguments, often on opposite sides of the same issue, contributes,
no doubt, to the impression reflected in this refrain. Indeed, researchers have also
documented that biased views of fairness significantly impact not only words but
decisions about the allocation of real economic resources, e.g., Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997). Nevertheless, this sentiment typically fails to distinguish the fairness of the
implicated stakeholder from that of the impartial spectator. Moreover, fairness bias
implies its complement: unbiased fairness. If an impartial standard exists, the crucial
question, which is both theoretical and at least potentially empirical, is how one can
identify what is just and the principles, if any, that guide unbiased justice. This paper
proposes an empirical approach to this question inspired by Adam Smith’s impartial
spectator model (1759). The evidence presented here indicates the relevance of
distributive preferences for economic policy across a wide range of real world contexts. It
is also consistent with the conclusion that there exists an empirical means for identifying
unbiased views that can inform social choice theory, welfare analysis and public policy.
This study employs a simple method with the aim of expanding our understanding
of two fundamental topics: unbiased justice preferences in real world contexts and the
nature of impartiality itself. The method of investigation is the one used in most studies
of empirical social choice, viz., attitude surveys consisting of vignettes (i.e., hypothetical
scenarios) that elicit preferences over the distribution of benefits or burdens.
Nevertheless, no previous study, to my knowledge, has addressed the particular problem
raised here. Different research questions require different methods, and there are
advantages and disadvantages with any choice. Given the goals of this study, a survey
method was chosen, because, among other reasons, it allows one better to target impartial
preferences and to do so over allocations in a wide range of contextually rich
circumstances like those encountered with real policy analysis.
On the first topic of unbiased justice, the questionnaire design was both informed
by theory and directed toward illuminating practical applications. Although much justice
research has focused on equality, an important and growing empirical literature reveals
widespread preferences for unequal allocations, e.g., Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and
Tungodden (forthcoming), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005), Frohlich and Oppenheimer
(1992), Gächter and Riedl (2005) and Schokkaert and DeVooght (2003). The current
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study is in this vein, and the eight distinct vignettes in the survey prompt more complex
distributive preferences that correspond to unequal allocations. They describe a wide
variety of real world ethical concerns, including environmental protection, fair wages,
welfare, job security, tort law, bioethics, globalization and media ethics. Four scenarios
vary information related to general justice concepts, including efficiency, equity, need,
and rectificatory justice. The other four scenarios examine trade-offs between different
distributive goals. These cases represent an uncharacteristically broad set of real world
applications for studies in this literature.
On the second topic of the paper, impartiality has often been conceptualized in the
Rawlsian sense: the ideal state for forming judgments about justice is an “original
position” in which stakeholders are placed behind a veil of ignorance of the specifics
associated with their stakes. That normative approach suggests that information is
associated with divergence of views, which is seemingly supported by studies that
indicate increased information contributes to biased moral views and higher rates of
dispute. The current study examines an alternate approach to impartiality inspired by
Adam Smith that seeks to elicit the judgments of impartial spectators, rather than
implicated stakeholders, who are informed, rather than ignorant, of relevant specifics.
The working hypothesis is that the impartial spectator, in contrast to the original position,
can be approximated empirically. But if spectator views can be empirically derived, this
provides a means for justice scholars to identify general principles of justice, a foundation
for social choice theory, and a practical guide for evaluating policy and implementing the
exigencies of justice in real situations. Moreover, the results of the current study indicate
that fairness information significantly shifts respondents’ views, outweighs the effects of
personal characteristics and results in a convergence of views, i.e., it significantly reduces
variance. These patterns bolster the claim that the impartial spectator can be
approximated in the real world and provide a different perspective from much previous
theoretical and empirical work.
An empirically informed theory of unbiased justice offers an attractive basis for
both normative and positive analysis. In particular, an impartial spectator theory of justice
is a promising approach to the kind of broad issues that are of concern to social choice
theorists. For instance, it can inform questions of voting, income distribution, wealth
distribution and taxation. An understanding of “unbiased justice” can assist political
discourse by helping to identify biased claims that are erroneously justified by
manipulation of justice principles to unjust ends. It also can serve as a guide for economic
policy in a variety of contexts, including in resolving labour-management conflicts, in the
regulation of industries, and in the allocation of costs and benefits of public programs.
Section 1 of this paper discusses theories of impartiality and summarizes and
argues for the “quasi-spectator” method employed in this study. Section 2 discusses the
justice concepts and trade-offs that inform the survey and presents the questions used in
the study. Section 3 summarizes the results on means and variances and presents the
results of regression analyses of the relative effects of relevant information versus
personal characteristics. Section 4 concludes.

1. Impartiality
This section examines different concepts of impartiality and elaborates on the
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impartial spectator model that is a topic of this study. Then I describe the empirical
method employed here, which is informed by the spectator model.
1.1. Conceptual framework
How does one conceptualize impartiality? Philosophers and social scientists have
proposed various approaches, but two notions of impartiality have dominated most
normative discourse in economics: the Rawlsian original position and the impartial
spectator (or impartial observer) model. In The Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls
explicated a thought experiment called the original position. This is a hypothetical state in
which self-interested individuals initially choose the principles that guide the basic
structure of society behind a “veil of ignorance” of any particulars related to themselves,
including information about their future position in that society. Rawls maintained that,
under such conditions, there would be a high level of agreement regarding the principles
of justice, which, he claimed, would protect the interests of the least well off member of
society. A different approach is the impartial spectator model, which can be traced to
David Hume (1751 [1983]) and, especially, to Adam Smith in his The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759 [1809]). Heirs to Smith’s legacy have stressed different aspects of his
writings and have interpreted them in different ways. Many readers have focused on
sympathy, whereby the impartial spectator assumes the positions of affected parties, both
cognitively and affectively. Common to both Rawls and Smith, however, is the notion
that impartiality creates consensus. Indeed, Rawls explicitly asserts that, behind a veil of
ignorance, people would reach unanimous agreement on the principles of justice. The
relationship between impartiality and consensus is an extremely important, but largely
ignored, aspect of both normative and positive justice research. Consensus provides a
compelling foundation for prescriptive claims of the superiority of one set of outcomes,
principles or ethical theories over another. In addition, some degree of consensus is
usually critical to the formulation and implementation of policies in most social and
political institutions. This, therefore, is one of the central subjects of this paper.
The chief impartial observer models known to economists are two that Harsanyi
proposed (although Harsanyi rarely made any connection to Smith). Amiel, Cowell and
Gaertner (2006) present an interesting empirical investigation of these two models. In the
one model (1978), Harsanyi proposes that individuals have internalized moral
preferences, which they might express as third parties (indeed, he suggests they might
even express these as stakeholders trying to remain impartial). Nevertheless, Harsanyi
allows that these moral preferences could differ across individuals. In the other model
(1953, 1955), he proposes that the impartial observer engages in a thought experiment.
The observer considers the objective and subjective circumstances of every person and
imagines himself having an equal probability of being each of those persons, ignoring his
own actual station. This latter model entails judgments from a hypothetical state and, in
this respect, resembles Rawls’s original position. Both of Harsanyi’s two models are
formulated in terms of lotteries with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, and in both cases
he argues for utilitarian ethics.
The models of Rawls and Harsanyi are extremely important contributions to this
literature. In this paper, however, I wish to examine an interpretation of Smith’s impartial
spectator model that differs in several respects from these other models. Harsanyi
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considers choice under risk, and the observers have potentially conflicting moral
preferences in the one model or engage in reasoning behind a veil of ignorance in the
other, as with Rawls. 1 In contrast, I propose and investigate the impartial spectator as one
who exists contemporaneously, is present in real people, is informed of the relevant
circumstances, embraces a common value system and whose judgments do not
necessarily (and, in Smith’s examples, usually do not explicitly) involve choice under
risk. Some parts of this characterization are consistent with Rawls or one of the Harsanyi
models, but none incorporates this particular configuration. Specifically, this impartial
spectator is not now and has no expectation of ever being implicated in the situation
being evaluated, that is, he has no stake, real or imagined, that might bias judgments of
right and wrong. Moreover, the spectator seeks to be fully informed of the relevant
particulars and processes this information rationally with respect to internalized values.
Smith believes that sympathetic identification can help one to understand better the
objective and subjective circumstances of others, so the spectator also engages in a kind
of exercise. This paper will focus on the incremental impact of adding information on
spectator views, an aspect of impartiality that has not only been largely neglected but that
is often considered anathema to impartiality. Nevertheless, it is crucial to exploring both
the justice principles as well as the very core of the proposed impartiality.
Obviously, as with all models of impartiality, the impartial spectator is stated in
an idealized form. Nevertheless, I believe what is promising about this approach is not
only its appeal to moral intuition but also its practical implications for empirical ethics
research. Veil of ignorance approaches have extremely stringent informational
requirements: agents must reason from self-interest but ignore any and every fact that
could introduce a self-interested bias into their judgments. The impartial spectator, on the
other hand, is not denied any information, including about his own station in life. Indeed,
the spectator is encouraged to acquire all information that might be relevant to reaching
moral decisions, including possibly from his own experiences and circumstances.
Impartiality in this model is achieved by considering only evaluations of individuals who
have no stake in the situation they are judging.
The veil of ignorance is problematic on conceptual grounds: how much
information is enough to evaluate allocations or institutions but not too much to bias
judgments? Can such conditions exist even hypothetically? Rawls would deny even
information about risk preference, but it is difficult to imagine the thought experiment
that obtains under such conditions. Nevertheless, the objection here is that it is even more
problematic to actualize the veil of ignorance in the real world. Frohlich and
Oppenheimer (1992) have simulated Rawlsian conditions in the laboratory using subjects
who in groups reason about and vote on redistribution prior to being informed about their
individual income classes. Their studies generate fascinating and compelling results
about group decision making and distributive preferences, which mostly contradict
Rawls’s claims about those preferences. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive that
people really leave their personal interests and experiences at the laboratory door, as the
veil of ignorance would require them to do, or that this thought experiment could be
extended to real world situations where positions are known and stakes are often high. In
1
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though, they consider risky choice behind different veils of ignorance.
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contrast, the impartial spectator is an informed party situated in the real world, even as an
ideal. Thus, one can more readily conceive of empirical tests of this model.
1.2. Quasi-spectator method
One can recognize the ideal of the impartial spectator in many real social
institutions. For example, judges, juries, independent arbitrators and regulators are all
supposed to be third parties who seek all relevant information on the issues they are
deciding without being tainted by any claim related to those same issues. Violations to
this impartiality are often prohibited by law. In matters of jurisprudence, the rules of
evidence are largely designed with the aim of liberally providing relevant information.
Nevertheless, the ideal conditions of impartial spectatorship are probably never realized
in the real world. For example, spectators with no material claim might still interject their
interests into a situation by vicarious identification with the one stakeholder or the other.
Even if self-interest plays no real or imagined role, spectator judgments can be biased by
biased information or biased experiences that impact processing of even complete
information. Given these facts, is there a means to identify to some degree of certainty
spectator judgments under the less than ideal conditions that exist in the real world?
I propose to take seriously the sometimes implicit and other times explicit claim
of most normative theory that impartiality results in unanimity. Since the conditions of
perfect impartiality are presumably never obtained, however, one can at best observe the
judgments of a “quasi-spectator.” This is an observer who has no salient stakes in the
matter at hand and is partially, but not completely, informed. Given incomplete
information, quasi-spectators might still disagree based on their differing assumptions
about the unknowns. The notion that “true” spectator views can at best be approximated
is in keeping with the kind of statistical uncertainty with which empirical researchers
routinely deal and with a distribution of measured views that is not degenerate. But what
evidence is there that spectator judgments can even be approximated? The critical
assumption of the quasi-spectator method I propose in this paper is that the answer to this
question is based on consensus. This is a convergent trend of opinion by quasi-spectators
that accompanies the addition of relevant information. Spectators are assumed to be
operating from a common set of values such that, as information related to their values is
added, their views of what is just will, on average, converge. Thus, complete impartiality
and, therefore, unanimity are probably never observed in the real world given the
difficulties of both eradicating all stakes and providing all relevant information. But
convergence, on average, toward a particular view by quasi-spectators as information is
added is taken as favourable evidence of the impartial spectator. Consistent with
normative theory (and empirical method), then, consensus is seen as a central and
compelling characteristic of an analysis of impartiality.
The specific quasi-spectator method of this study is a between subjects survey
design. There are two treatments. In the low information treatment, one set of respondents
reads a scenario involving the distribution of some variable of social or economic value,
e.g., how much to reduce the discharge of a pulp mill’s pollutants into a river given the
environmental impact and the effect on employment at the mill. The participants are not
cast in any stakeholder role in the scenario, indeed, the text of some scenarios in this
study explicitly promotes a third party view, e.g., the pulp mill is portrayed as being
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located in a different part of the country so as to minimize any imagined concern by
respondents for their own employment or hardship from the pollution. The response
format is continuous on a closed interval, e.g., the pollutants can be reduced by any
amount between 0% and 100%. In the high information treatment, a different group of
respondents reads a scenario that is identical to the low information one, save the addition
of a passage that contains supplemental information that is considered relevant.
Relevance was defined by an empirical criterion, namely, based on whether the
information generated a statistically significant shift in the mean response of participants
(this is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2). In the pollution scenario, the additional
passage provided more information about the consequences of different levels of
pollution reduction for workers and neighbours of the mill. The between subjects design
was chosen in order to avoid any tendency on the part of participants consciously to overrespond or under-respond to the different versions. Consensus consistent with the
spectator model is seen here as a reduction in the variance around the respective means in
the high information versus the low information treatments. Demographic information
was also collected and employed to evaluate the importance for judgments of relevant
information relative to personal characteristics.
The quasi-spectator method described above is very simple, but, to my
knowledge, no previous study has addressed precisely this question or possessed a design
consisting of these particular elements. Although it is a prominent feature of normative
theory, consensus has remained relatively neglected in the empirical analysis of justice.
In most research, treatment effects have focused on differences in means or categorical
choices, rather than differences in variance. Thus, most survey studies in this area have
employed discrete choice formats, e.g., as with the seminal contribution by Yaari and
Bar-Hillel (1984) to empirical social choice (although Gaertner, 1994, is one exception).
There are advantages to the discrete choice format (including possibly simplifying the
cognitive task), but given the interest here not only in means but variance, the continuous
response format is a more natural choice. The specific manner in which information is
varied in this study is also significant. As mentioned above, a between subjects design
was chosen to preclude any interaction between versions of the same question. More
importantly, most previous studies that vary informational content do so using
contrasting versions, e.g., the important and seminal survey study of fairness by
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) presented alternate passages in different versions
of scenarios. The interesting and informative results of this study stimulated an
impressive volume of subsequent research. In the current study, on the other hand, the
focus is on the marginal effect of additional information, for which information must be
varied incrementally. 2
The premise of the quasi-spectator model, viz., that information is directly related
to consensus, runs counter to what one would conclude from the few studies that shed
light on this relationship. For example, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) report a series
of experimental and field studies of bargaining with plentiful information. They find that
informing subjects of their positions increases rates of bargaining disputes and impasse,
which they trace to biased processing of information. This claim finds support in the
psychology literature indicating that biases increase with the number of criteria at one’s
2
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disposal (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989). Nevertheless, these studies
involve stakeholders, i.e., implicated parties whose judgments are impacted by selfinterest. It is not surprising that, when interests diverge, views are biased and disperse.
In contrast, the current study is concerned with the moral claims of third parties.
Even with quasi-spectators, however, it is not clear on a priori grounds whether or how
information would affect convergence. On the one hand, additional information could
complicate moral reasoning, resulting in increased noise. Also, if individuals do not agree
on moral principles or on their relative importance or residual interests corrupt their
judgment, information could introduce elements that feed these tendencies toward
divergent views. On the other hand, the quasi-spectator approach outlined above
postulates that people operate from a common set of principles. If agents entertain
multiple principles, then this model posits that, at least as impartial spectators, they share
a common sense of how to weigh the principles, i.e., there is a high level of agreement on
trade-offs. Relevant information allows quasi-spectators to reduce the role of potentially
differing implicit assumptions and to evaluate more accurately the implications of their
principles, resulting in greater consensus. Whether information contributes to convergent
or divergent moral judgments by spectators is an important open question that, to my
knowledge, has not been examined systematically elsewhere.
Some experimental evidence suggests that information promotes consensus. In
Konow (2005), I analyzed a series of studies, including bargaining experiments by Alvin
Roth and his colleagues, in which information was varied. High information was
generally found to decrease the variance of expected payoffs. Nevertheless, those
experiments were not designed to address the question at hand and, therefore, limit the
conclusions one can draw in this regard for at least two reasons. First, those experiments
involved stakeholders bargaining over their own payoffs rather than spectators expressing
unbiased preferences. Second, the procedures of the experiments provided little or no
context for moral judgment, even in the high information conditions.
The highly controlled conditions of the laboratory can prove a powerful means of
investigation, and it is often appropriate to restrict information about many variables,
including subject contributions, abilities, choices, needs, and identity. The results of a
number of experiments suggest, however, that subject decisions under such conditions
are not always representative of the more complex distributive justice preferences
typically encountered in real life. In particular, when the context is very lean, decisions
appear to be made more frequently based on heuristics than is the case in high stake
situations in real life. For example, in many experiments there is no justice relevant
information and equal splits often emerge as a modal choice, including in the simple
versions of the ultimatum game, the dictator game, and the trust game. Equal splits
appear to arise here by default, not because of any general preference for equality. 3
Under such conditions, increasing information about individuals and variables of interest
might very well increase variance, ostensibly contrary to the claim of the quasi-spectator
model. But the object of the current study, and the domain of the quasi-spectator model
3
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more careful justice evaluation.
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that motivates it, is moral judgments made under conditions approximating the usually
richer information set found in the real world. That is, our method proceeds from a base
(the low information condition) in which decisions at least potentially reflect some degree
of moral reflection and do not just reduce by default to equal splits, and it then explores
the effect on variance of additional information (in the high information condition). For
this reason, it employs surveys applied to a number of real allocation problems in a wide
range of situations with some context, even in the low information conditions.

2. Justice: Principles and Trade-offs
One of the two main goals of this study is to produce evidence on distributive
preferences and on the trade-offs between conflicting distributive goals, or justice in a
broad sense. Justice is also the context within which the other subject matter of this
paper, impartiality, is studied. This section presents the content of the questionnaire and
its relationship to justice and details the design and administration of the survey.
2.1. Questionnaire
The complete questionnaire consists of eight vignettes (or hypothetical scenarios)
that cover a wide range of social institutions and policy areas. Four are inspired by four
different concepts of justice (efficiency, need, accountability and rectificatory justice) and
four are framed in the context of four different fields of applied ethics (environmental
ethics, media ethics, bioethics and business ethics). A word about the first three concepts
of justice (efficiency, need and accountability) is in order: these are three principles that I
have proposed as a part of a general theory of distributive justice (e.g., Konow, 2003). In
that theory, context, or the set of salient variables and individuals, determines the relative
importance of principles and the trade-offs among them. Actually, any set of principles or
values that is associated with a significant shift in responses when information is added
would have sufficed, but I chose ones that have been found in other studies to have
substantial explanatory power. Here the principles are applied to new contexts, which
permits additional tests of their generality.
Table 1
Summary of Questions
Social institution

Policy area

Justice concept
1. Efficiency principle
2. Need principle
3. Accountability principle
4. Rectificatory justice

Firm
Government
Labour market
Judiciary

Resource allocation
Welfare
Wage setting
Tort law

Applied ethics
5. Environmental ethics
6. Media ethics
7. Bioethics
8. Business ethics

Regulatory agency
Media/entertainment industry
Health care industry
Firm

Environmental regulation
Mergers
Resource allocation
Globalization

Table 1 summarizes the eight questions according to which of the four justice
8

concepts or four applied ethics fields they belong, the social institution in which they are
framed and the specific policy area that is addressed. Tables 2 and 3 exhibit the content
of the vignettes. The passages in both brackets and italic were not present in the low
information condition but were added to the text in the high information condition. I will
now discuss briefly each of the questions.
Table 2
Justice Concept Questions
1. A large company has two divisions. The one division produces film for traditional cameras, which is the
business the company was founded on. The other, newer division is focused on technologies for digital
photography and printing. Due to changing consumer demand, the traditional film division is on the decline
and its share of company revenues is falling. The company’s budget for plant, machinery and equipment in
the coming year totals $10 billion, and its board must decide how much of this to devote to the film
division and how much to the digital division. [Company finance analysts expect revenues from the film
division to fall from 60% currently to only 10% in five years. In order to protect the company’s financial
health and survival, they recommend focusing expenditures for plant, machinery and equipment on the
digital division and devoting $9 billion of next year’s budget to the digital division and only $1 billion to
the film division.] How much of this $10 billion do you think the board should budget for the film division
of the company (Enter a number in billions of dollars from 0 to 10)?
$ _______ billion
2. The state provides support to those in need for a limited period of time. For example, John, who needs
one year to complete a high school diploma, is eligible to receive such support. [The state has determined
that the basic needs of a person living in this area for food, housing and clothing equal $800 per month.]
How much do you think the state should provide in total support for John per month (Enter a number from
$0 to $1000)?
$ ________ per month
3. Suppose Adam and Bill worked last weekend stuffing envelopes for a mass mailing. This job took a total
of 11 man hours, but Adam worked more hours than Bill. [Specifically, Adam worked 8 hours whereas Bill
worked 3 hours.] The total pay for this 11 hour job is $100. How much of this $100 do you think Adam and
Bill should each receive (Enter amounts for each person below and make sure the two amounts total $100)?
Adam $ _______
Bill
$ _______
Total
$100
4. You are the judge deciding the outcome of a civil suit brought by a motorcyclist against the driver of a
car that hit him. The suit demands $100,000 in damages for medical expenses, loss of earnings and pain
and suffering (vehicle repairs were covered by insurance), but the actual award could be anything between
$0 and $100,000. In court testimony, the facts have been presented as follows. The motorcyclist pulled out
of a parking lot into a street a few feet from a stop sign and was thrown from his motorcycle when the car
struck him. [As a result of the accident, the motorcyclist has lost earnings of about $3,000 due to missed
work time and has incurred medical expenses of around $12,000.] How much do you think the court should
require driver of the car to pay the motorcyclist (Enter a number from $0 to $100,000)?
$ ___________

Question 1 is motivated by the efficiency principle, which advocates the
maximization of aggregate surplus. A number of studies have found support for this goal,
e.g., Charness and Rabin (2002) and Kritikos and Bolle (2001). Specifically, this question
addresses the matter of allocating firm resources to maximize consumer satisfaction and
shareholder value in the context of the kind of real technological changes we have
observed in recent years. Question 2 addresses the need principle, which simply requires
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that allocations be sufficient to meet each individual’s basic requirements for life,
including for food, shelter and clothing. In this example, needs are met through state
support. Evidence of a concern for needs is apparent, for example, in the studies of
Gaertner, Jungeilges and Neck (2001) and Kravitz and Gunto (1992).
Question 3 reflects the accountability principle. Whereas the efficiency and need
principles deal with the absolute size of allocations, the accountability principle addresses
the relative size of allocations across individuals. It calls for allocations to be in
proportion to the factors that affect contributions and that individuals can control. For
example, a worker who is twice as productive as another should be paid twice as much, if
his greater productivity is due entirely to factors he can control (e.g., hours worked) but
not if it is due to factors outside his control (e.g., a physical disability). This principle
finds support in the results of surveys and experiments (see Konow, 2000, 2003). Since
the only difference between the workers in question 3 is hours worked, one would expect
a fair distribution of earnings to be in proportion to their fraction of total hours.
Question 4 is about rectificatory, or corrective, justice. Whereas the three
principles outlined above deal with distribution, this concept has to do with
redistribution. Rectificatory justice, which can be traced to Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics, addresses an initial injustice that must be rectified by the redistribution of benefits
or burdens between individuals in order to establish or re-establish equity according to
the reigning justice principle or principles in the particular context. In the case in which
one party is wronged by another, Aristotle’s claim is simply that the one should
compensate the other for losses. The scenario in this question is inspired by a tort case
based on a real trial that was employed in a series of studies of fairness bias reported in
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997). 4
The first four questions focus on individual justice concepts. The next four
questions, on the other hand, draw from applied ethics fields and pose contemporary
problems in which conflicts between different distributive goals are more prominent.
These are scenarios for which people can be expected to have distributive preferences,
indeed potentially conflicting ones, but these questions are constructed without any
presuppositions about what those preferences are. An important goal of the analysis is to
examine the effects of additional information on mean judgments and to consider the
implications for justice concepts and trade-offs between competing distributive goals. On
the matter of variance, however, another feature of questions 1 through 4 is that they are
open to the objection that any convergence might be due to a focal point effect associated
with the additional information.
Nevertheless, evidence against the focal point hypothesis is produced if
convergence occurs even when the additional information either provides multiple and
disperse values, as in question 5, or provides no specific values, as in question 6.
Question 5 involves a classic case of a negative externality in which the benefits of
pollution reduction must be weighed against the costs in terms of lost jobs. Question 6
portrays a scenario inspired by the Time Warner merger of 1989, where the private
interests of corporations are balanced against the public good of providing information on
matters of public interest.

4

I wish to thank Linda Babcock for kindly sharing the materials they used in those studies.
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Table 3
Applied Ethics Questions
5. The Environmental Protection Agency (or EPA) is responsible for regulating the discharge of degradable
waste by a pulp mill into a river. The pulp mill involved is located in a different region of the country. The
EPA must decide whether to require the pulp mill to reduce its waste discharges into the river and, if so, by
how much. Doing so would reduce various adverse effects of the discharge, but complying with EPA
requirements would also require the pulp mill to cut its labor force of 400 workers and, perhaps, to close
down altogether. [Cutting the waste by 30% would eliminate the noxious odors coming from the river but
would result in the unemployment of 10 workers at the pulp mill. Cutting the waste by 60% would also
make the river safe for drinking, swimming and fishing, but would cause a total of 20 workers to be laid off.
Eliminating the waste altogether (that is, reducing it by 100%) would allow the return of an additional type
of fish valued by some sports fishermen but would make the pulp mill unprofitable so that it would have to
close down and lay off all 400 of its workers.] By how much, if any, do you think the EPA should require
the pulp mill to reduce its discharges (Enter a number from 0% for “no reduction” to 100% for “complete
elimination” in the space below)?
______ %
6. Newstime, Inc. is a financially sound corporation that publishes several long established and respected
magazines. These magazines provide the sole source of its $30 billion in annual revenue and represent
about one-tenth of the magazine market nationwide. There are numerous smaller magazine publishers, but
they generally specialize in niche markets and do not have sufficient resources or expertise to support
general news reporting. Several companies in the movie industry are interested in merging with Newstime
in order to take advantage of mutually beneficial business opportunities. The largest and most profitable
merger would be with Entertainment Studios, which would generate estimated total annual revenues of
$100 billion from the combined magazine and movie operations. [Opponents of this merger argue that
similar mergers have resulted in higher magazine prices and have seriously compromised journalistic
integrity. They give many examples, such as the case in which, after such a merger, a once venerable news
magazine ignored news of wars and humanitarian disasters in favor of sensationalized coverage aimed at
promoting second rate movies produced within its entertainment division.] The possibilities for Newstime,
then, are 1) to break up and become smaller and more specialized, 2) to maintain its operations at their
current size ($30 billion annual revenue), or 3) to become a larger corporation by merging with a film and
TV corporation. In terms of annual revenue, how large a corporation do you think Newstime should be
(Enter a number in billions of dollars from 0 to 100 in the space below)?
$ ______ billion
7. A hospital budget committee must decide how much of the budget it controls to allocate to the hospital’s
emergency services versus to its preventive services for the community. [At present, many patients in the
community go to the emergency room for their non-emergency needs because they are uninsured. By
increasing the budget to preventative services to 60%, the needs of these patients would be covered, and
the reduced burden on emergency services would allow it to provide almost the same level of services as
previously.] What percentage of the budget do you think should be allocated to preventative services (Enter
a number from 0% to 100% in the space below)?
______ %
8. A medium sized manufacturing company has already moved 20% of its operations from the US to a
developing country because of cost considerations. [The company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has
commissioned several studies and reports that the company must move 60% of its operations to the
developing country or it will go bankrupt.] What percentage of its operations do you think this company
should locate in the developing country, whereby any remaining operations remain in the US (Enter a
number from 0% to 100% in the space below)?
______ %

In many communities, emergency care has been threatened in recent years and is
viewed by some as being at critically low levels. Question 7 addresses the provision of
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emergency care versus preventative services at a hospital that has insufficient resources
to fund both fully. One of the important transformations associated with globalization is
the movement of many manufacturing operations from developed countries to developing
countries. Question 8 describes the situation of a US company that must decide how
much of its operations to locate in a developing country.
2.2. Design and administration of survey
This study employs a questionnaire design consisting of vignettes administered to
subjects who are university students. This approach has been widely employed in the
empirical social choice literature, e.g., Gaertner, Jungeilges and Neck (2001) and
Schokkaert and Capeau (1991). I will review some of the reasons for these choices (and a
few have already been alluded to), but a more detailed discussion of using a student
subject pool and of the advantages and disadvantages of different methods of
investigation into justice preferences can be found in Konow (2003).
Experiments allow stricter controls, but we are interested here in judgments
embedded in real social institutions, and vignettes provide a contextual richness that is
better suited to that end. On a related point, such scenarios have been shown to aid
reasoning in comparison to abstract problem solving. A survey was also a more practical
choice, given the large number of scenarios, the between subjects design for the low and
high information treatments of each scenario, and the more than 100 observations that
were collected for each information condition of each scenario. This concern was
amplified by the fact that the results analysed in this paper were a fraction of a larger
study that involved not only the two versions of each question reported here but a total of
twelve versions per scenario. Moreover, it would be prohibitively costly to investigate
this many variations in paid experiments or the field. Material stakes have sometimes
been shown to produce significant differences in behaviour (e.g., Forsythe, Horowitz,
Savin and Sefton, 1994), although Rubinstein (1999) compares numerous studies with
and without pay and concludes that the results are qualitatively the same. Nevertheless,
stakes risk introducing a different bias that is troubling for this particular study, namely, a
self-interested bias. Hypothetical decisions, on the other hand, are an appropriate means
for targeting the impartial preferences of interest here. Given the large number of total
observations needed, a convenience sample of students was used. Specifically, students
signed up to participate in the survey to satisfy a course requirement for psychology and
economics classes. Student respondents are standard in empirical social choice, and a
comparison of student and non-student populations across a number of studies of fairness
and moral judgment suggests no remarkable pattern of subject pool effects.
Seeing the actual questions in the previous section, the reader might have a sense
of the direction in which the additional information could carry responses. Indeed, that is
exactly what is hoped for, if the premise behind the quasi-spectator model is correct: the
interpretation of any convergence in the high versus low information conditions is
precisely that the additional information allows respondents to evaluate the fairness of
allocations more accurately based on their common values, which readers presumably
also share, on average. Nevertheless, this could also raise the suspicion that convergence
is specific to the wording of the questions (apart from the focal point issue addressed in
the previous section). Although this concern can never be entirely dismissed given the
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contextual richness of vignettes, a brief description of the method for selecting the
context should hopefully diminish it.
The data for this study were drawn from a larger project that explored empirically
the effects of both relevant and irrelevant information on spectators and two types of
stakeholders (the other results are reported in Konow, 2006). As previously described,
informational relevance is defined here empirically as content that produces a statistically
significant shift in mean spectator responses. In this project, irrelevant information is
defined as content, which when added to relevant information, does not produce a
statistically significant change in mean responses of spectators. Content satisfying these
criteria was chosen partly through a trial and error process. This process began with
content that was expected to alter responses, in the case of relevant information, and that
was not expected to do so, in the case of irrelevant information. Expectations, however,
were proven wrong on numerous occasions: context expected ex ante to cause a shift
sometimes did not, and content expected ex ante not to change mean responses often did.
Ultimately, wording was chosen and information was categorized as relevant or irrelevant
based, not on ex ante expectations or on its effect on variance, but on ex post statistical
tests of differences in means. If, in fact, it appeals to common values, relevant
information does imply a greater degree of specificity, but its relevance is demonstrated
empirically by changes in mean views, as needed to test the quasi-spectator approach.
Various measures were undertaken consistent with good survey design. In order
not to tax respondent attention, no subject answered more than six questions, and on each
questionnaire form, long versions of scenarios were balanced with short versions of other
scenarios. Simple and clear instructions prompted respondents to choose the allocation
corresponding to what they thought “should” be done in each scenario (instructions and
the demographic questionnaire can be found in the Appendix). To deal with possible
order effects, a randomized Latin square design was employed. That is, scenarios were
randomly assigned to a variety of different orders. To facilitate comparison of results
across scenarios, the response interval for all questions was from zero to a power of ten
(i.e., 10, 100, 1000, etc.). A total of 1383 respondents participated in this study, which
was conducted from November 2003 to April 2006. The author read the instructions and
answered any questions for all sessions. Participants were seated at a distance and turned
in their forms so that no one, including the author, could trace a form to a given subject.

3. Results and Analysis
Section 3.1 presents the results on means and variances for the high and low
information conditions of each scenario as well as tests of differences in means and
variances between the two treatments. Multivariate regression analyses that include
personal characteristics are then reported in Section 3.2.
3.1. Analysis of Means and Variances
The mean, variance and number of observations are summarized by question and
information condition in Table 4. Tests of differences in means and variances are also
presented in this table. Considering first the effects of information on mean responses to
questions, the additional information in the high information condition shifted views at
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Table 4
Effects of Information on Means and Variances
Information condition
High

Question
Justice concept
1. Efficiency principle

2. Need principle

3. Accountability principle

4. Rectificatory justice

Applied ethics
5. Environmental ethics

6. Media ethics

7. Bioethics

8. Business ethics

Low

Hypothesis tests

Mean
Variance
Observs.

Mean
Variance
Observs.

Difference
in means
(t-statistic)

2.53
2.32
111

3.85
6.58
112

–1.32***
(–4.70)

771
43,759
105

444
68,736
102

327***
(9.89)

73.4
36.8
112

60.2
44.9
112

13.2***
(15.43)

33,245
0.41E9
108

55,157
1.19E9
122

–21,912***
(–5.96)

60.1
245.1
104

42.1
620.7
103

18.0***
(6.23)

46.4
515.9
121

58.6
1018.1
122

–12.2***
(–3.44)

56.7
78.7
108

44.8
286.8
103

12.8***
(6.86)

54.9
405.4
129

35.1
603.2
123

19.8***
(6.97)

Difference
in variances
(F-statistic)

–4.26***
(2.83)
–24,977**
(1.57)
–8.1
(1.22)
–0.78E9***
(2.90)

–375.6***
(2.53)
–502.2***
(1.97)
–208.1***
(3.64)
–197.8**
(1.49)

Notes: */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level. The tests of difference in means are based on
two-tail t-tests. For question 4, variance is expressed in billions of dollars (i.e., E9).

high levels of significance. Beginning with the justice questions, the shifts are as
predicted. The additional information in question 1 on the consequences for consumers
and stakeholders in the company results in a significant decrease in funding for the film
division, in line with a concern for efficiency. In question 2, information on the high cost
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of meeting basic needs is associated with an increase in support for the needy individual.
Explicit information about the larger than expected discrepancy in hours between the two
workers in question 3 results in increase in pay to the one who worked longer and a
proportional distribution of pay consistent with the accountability principle: Adam
worked 72.7% of the total hours (8 out of 11) , and respondents gave him 73.4% of the
total pay, an insignificant difference (t=1.19, two-tailed p=.23). In question 4,
information about the costs associated with the accident causes a significant reduction in
judgments in the direction of compensating that loss (perhaps with some compensation
for pain and suffering). All of these results strongly indicate the impact of the three
principles of distributive justice and of rectificatory justice.
The applied ethics questions were not consciously designed with specific
distributive principles in mind. An analysis of their means is, therefore, less interesting
than with the first four questions, so I will discuss their means only briefly. Additional
information about the consequences for the environment and employment of pollution
reduction reduces allowable discharges in Question 5. Information about the potential
adverse effects for news reporting of a merger in question 6 is associated with decreased
support for merging. For question 7, information about the ability to increase preventative
services with minimal sacrifice to emergency services results in an increase in funding to
the former. Information about the dangers of the status quo in question 8 motivates
respondents to support moving a larger fraction of operations abroad.
A comparison of variances across information conditions is striking: high
information is associated with reduced variance in every instance, and these reductions
are significant at the 5% level for seven of eight questions. 5 The quasi-spectator approach
predicts that increased relevant information will, on average, reduce variance, which
these results corroborate. Variance falls significantly with information even in the case of
question 5, where the text provides multiple values, and question 6, where the additional
information states no values. In general, an examination of the specific responses of
subjects in the high information condition provides little support that the shifts are merely
a focal point effect. Focal points should, by definition, attract a high percentage of
responses, but only in the cases of questions 5 and 7 do more than one-half of
respondents choose a number implied by the information, and the percentage of subjects
choosing such an allocation in the other six questions runs between only 15% and 31%.
3.2. Regression Analysis
The results reported above suggest that distributive preferences are impacted by
the information provided in the scenarios. Nevertheless, it is possible that these effects
are operating through some tertiary variable. Moreover, even if justice relevant
information is driving these results, the question remains about the size and importance of
these ethical considerations relative to other forces. In this section, therefore, we consider
the effects of various personal characteristics on responses. These are interesting, both
because of the possibility that justice evaluation differs across gender, race, major,
5

In the case of question 3, where these differences are not significant, the variance is quite low in the high
information condition, but the reduction is relatively small, because the variance in the low information
condition is also rather small. This appears to be a fluke: knowing only that Adam worked longer than John
in the low information condition, many respondents guessed that the former worked 60% of the hours.
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income class, etc., and because these characteristics might also serve as proxies for other
influences on moral judgment besides justice. As an example of the latter, low income
respondents might support more redistribution in the welfare scenario because of a selfinterested identification with that group (and, conversely, high income might support less
redistribution out of self-interest).
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions of the pooled responses from the
high and low information conditions on a set of explanatory variables for each of the
eight questions. The first six regressors are dummy variables. The Information dummy
equals 1 for the High Information condition and 0 for the Low Information condition.
The Gender dummy equals 1 for female and 0 for male. The Nonwhite dummy equals 0
for white and 1 for all other categories – Nonwhite was collapsed into a single variable
due to the low number of observations in certain more specific categories and because of
the mostly similar patterns for nonwhites. The college dummies (Business,
Communications/Fine Arts, Science/Engineering) identify which of the four colleges at
this university the respondent’s major is in, where Liberal Arts is the omitted category.
Class is the year in school, followed by Age, Expenditures on all categories during the
school year, Parents’ annual income (estimated to intervals of $25,000), Hours worked by
the respondent per week and annual Earnings over the past year. The personal
characteristic variables mostly had low or insignificant correlations with one another.
Two exceptions were the relatively high Class/Age and Hours worked/Earnings
correlations, respectively. Therefore, I ran four separate regressions for each question
using only two variables from each of these categories (i.e., Class/Hours, Class/Earnings,
Age/Hours, Age/Earnings). These revealed no differences in the signs of significant
variables and almost no differences in levels of significance, so the regressions reported
here use the complete set of explanatory variables. 6
In Table 5, the Information dummy is highly significant for all eight questions.
Indeed, this variable has the highest level of significance of any explanatory variable in
every regression. The signs of the information effect on responses controlling for other
variables are consistent with the simple results on means in Table 4. In fact, even the
magnitudes of the information effects in Table 5 are very close to the differences in
means in Table 4. Of the 88 remaining coefficients on the personal characteristic
variables, only 9% (i.e., 8) are significant at the 5% level. I will discuss the personal
characteristic variables briefly and suggest interpretations of the significant results.
Gender is not significantly related to moral judgments in these scenarios, contrary
to some studies of social preferences, although probably consistent with most. The
significant coefficient on the Nonwhite dummy in question 2 indicates that this group
supports $81 more welfare support per month than whites. This might reflect a stronger
belief on their part in the value of government support for education and for addressing
basic needs. Only two results on major are significant, whereby no coefficient on Science
and Engineering is significant. Business students support about $2 less than the
proportional pay (and less than Liberal Arts students) in question 3. Perhaps as future
6

In the few cases where significance changes, most involve significant variables being more so using the
complete set, contrary to expectations, which should allay any concern that the impact of any personal
characteristic is being understated in the reported regressions. The one exception is question 6, where
Expenditures generates a p-value slightly greater than 0.05 in the regression with all regressors and a pvalue slightly less than 0.05 in three of the four regressions using only two of the four variables in question.
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Table 5
Regression Analysis
Regressors

1. Efficiency

2. Need

Question
4. Rectific. 5. Environ.

3. Account.

6. Media

7. Bioeths.

8. Busns.

Information

–1.283***
(0.288)

333.3***
(33.3)

13.34***
(0.82)

–21637***
(3936)

19.08***
(2.97)

–12.74***
(3.57)

13.75***
(1.89)

18.59***
(2.91)

Gender

–0.011
(0.300)

–4.6
(35.7)

–0.55
(0.86)

4137
(4202)

4.45
(3.18)

0.38
(3.68)

1.29
(2.00)

–1.80
(3.09)

Nonwhite

0.458
(0.315)

81.5*
(37.3)

–1.69
(0.90)

4549
(4148)

–2.11
(3.33)

3.43
(3.72)

–0.09
(2.05)

–0.36
(3.08)

Business

–0.280
(0.347)

–23.4
(42.1)

–2.09*
(0.97)

–657
(4571)

0.95
(3.71)

–2.65
(4.30)

–2.30
(2.23)

–2.80
(3.53)

Communications/Fine Arts

0.599
(0.431)

–2.6
(55.8)

–1.70
(1.28)

–1451
(6302)

–1.80
(4.94)

–18.01**
(6.03)

–0.25
(2.62)

–6.10
(4.47)

Science/Engineering

0.106
(0.536)

–5.3
(56.2)

0.04
(1.45)

–14087
(8262)

–2.85
(5.12)

2.33
(6.80)

–4.05
(3.95)

4.03
(5.82)

Class

0.405
(0.299)

–19.1
(30.0)

–0.29
(1.02)

4426
(3477)

1.48
(2.62)

1.68
(3.55)

1.38
(1.31)

2.77
(2.86)

Age

–0.567**
(0.206)

18.8*
(7.7)

–0.51
(0.83)

–599
(2828)

0.29
(0.68)

–1.80
(2.73)

0.63
0.41

–4.33*
(2.15)

Expenditures ($1000/year)

0.014
(0.010)

–1.5
(1.4)

0.00
(0.02)

255*
(114)

–0.10
(0.13)

0.20
(0.10)

0.02
(0.05)

0.04
(0.08)

Parents income

0.031
(0.082)

9.1
(9.7)

–0.25
(0.23)

–413
(1096)

–0.35
(0.85)

1.94
(1.00)

–0.48
(0.53)

0.36
(0.81)

Hours worked (per week)

–0.010
(0.015)

–0.9
(1.8)

0.00
(0.05)

–234
(225)

–0.17
(0.17)

–0.10
(0.20)

0.07
(0.11)

–0.16
(0.18)

Earnings ($1000/year)

0.092**
(0.030)

1.8
(7.3)

–0.06
(0.14)

81
(418)

–0.06
(0.06)

0.10
(0.44)

–0.12
(0.23)

0.46
(0.38)

Observations

214

204

216

220

203

237

202

247

R-squared

0.16

0.37

0.60

0.17

0.20

0.13

0.25

0.19

Notes: */**/*** denotes a p-value less than .05/.01/.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted categories for the dummy variables are white, male and Liberal Arts
College.
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managers, these students are more sensitive to the appearance of equity (i.e., equality)
than to real equity (i.e., proportionality). Communications students strongly support
keeping Newstime smaller, against the forces of merging. The most plausible explanation
seems to be that, by virtue of their professionally oriented training, they are more
sensitive than other majors to the adverse impact on the journalistic mission of the
magazine of merging with an entertainment company.
Class has no significant impact, but Age has three that seem reasonable. Older
respondents appear to be more efficiency-oriented in question 1 (for every additional year
of age, budgeting $567 million less to the less efficient division), to be more generous in
supporting the completion of the student’s education in question 2 (by about $19 per year
of age), and to want to protect US operations over foreign outsourcing of jobs to a greater
extent in question 8 (by moving about 4% fewer operations abroad per year of age).
Respondents in question 4 want to award the damaged party $255 more for every $1000
more they spend each year, or $3842 for a one standard deviation difference in
expenditures ($15,066). Parents’ income and Hours worked have no significant effects.
Subjects who earn more seem less supportive of efficiency changes in question 1, the
only significant result for which no obvious explanation occurs.
These results suggest that personal characteristics occasionally insinuate
themselves into these moral decisions, even in the case of spectators. Nevertheless, as
predictors of distributive preferences, personal characteristics are neither as reliable nor
as significant as the information dummies. A separate question, however, is how
important a variable is, i.e., how much of the variance in the dependent variable a
regressor explains. That is, although information is more significant than any personal
characteristic, personal characteristics might, nonetheless, explain a higher fraction of the
variance in distributive preferences than information. The typical approach to this is to
examine semi-partial correlations, i.e., the percentage of the variance in the dependent
variable that a given regressor uniquely explains, and to compare these for different
regressors. This is equivalent to the change in the value of the R-squared when a variable
is added to the regression. 7 Based on this, tests show that information accounts for a
larger fraction of the variance in distributive preferences than any single personal
characteristic in all scenarios. Indeed, information explains more variance than all of the
personal characteristics combined for all but one of the eight questions. This is illustrated
in Table 6, which shows the R-squared values for separate regressions on the information
dummy and on all personal characteristics. All personal characteristics combined explain
only 3% to 8% of the variance, whereas information accounts for 9% to 52% of the
variance, ignoring question 6. The former outweighs the latter in question 6, in part
because of the strong reaction of Communications students, but information still explains
more variance than any single personal characteristic variable even in this scenario.
The results in this section suggest that information affects views of fairness in a
manner consistent with a common set of spectator values. This comes from an analysis of
the effects of general principles and agreed upon trade-offs on means and variances.
Among the possible influences, personal characteristics always matter less than
7

The sum of these semi-partial correlations will not, however, usually add up to the R-squared for the
regression with all regressors because of correlations between the regressors and for the practical reason
that the R-squared sometimes differs due to different numbers of observations in the regressions caused by
missing data (as is the case with these data).
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information, and usually do not matter at all. Relevant information produces the strongest
and most robust effects on moral judgments.
Table 6
Importance of Information versus Personal Characteristics
Regressors (R-squared)
Information
dummy

Personal
characteristics

0.09

0.08

2. Need principle

0.32

0.04

3. Accountability principle

0.52

0.07

4. Rectificatory justice

0.13

0.05

0.16

0.03

6. Media ethics

0.05

0.08

7. Bioethics

0.19

0.04

8. Business ethics

0.16

0.05

Question
Justice concept
1. Efficiency principle

Applied ethics
5. Environmental ethics

4. Conclusions
This study laid out two goals: to expand our understanding of unbiased
preferences for general distributive principles and for trade-offs between distributive
goals in real life situations, and to state and investigate empirically the quasi-spectator
model of impartiality. On the first point, the results from the high information conditions
of the first four questions are consistent with general justice concepts. Efficiency is found
to matter when changing consumer demand requires an adjustment in a firm’s
investments. Respondents increase state support to a student to meet his basic needs.
Consistent with accountability, earnings are put into proportion with the hours workers
choose. Compensation to the victim of a vehicular accident is adjusted toward damages.
In the last four questions, a high level of agreement in the trade-offs between competing
distributive goals is found in the cases of reducing pollution versus preserving jobs,
promoting corporate profits versus protecting the integrity of news reporting, balancing
resources for preventative care with those for emergency care, and ensuring the solvency
of a company versus protecting domestic jobs.
On the matter of impartiality, the quasi-spectator model postulates a direct
relationship between relevant information and consensus, i.e., reduced variance in moral
judgments. This result is, in fact, opposed to other important theoretical claims and
empirical findings. First, normative approaches to impartiality, like Rawls’s, typically
associate impartiality with the reduction, rather than the increase, of information. Second,
empirical studies of fairness bias suggest that information feeds self-serving biases and
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disagreements. Of course, the important distinction in the current proposal in comparison
to these others is the focus on informed spectators, rather than informed stakeholders. But
a third point is that it is not obvious that increased information should favourably affect
spectator judgments, both on a priori grounds (e.g., information could complicate moral
reasoning) and on the basis of empirical findings. In the aforementioned related study
(Konow, 2006), I find that irrelevant information does not reliably affect spectator
consensus: variance might increase or decrease, but it is usually not significantly affected.
As we see in the current study, however, relevant information does reliably reduce
variance and is both more significant and more important in explaining the variance in
quasi-spectator views of justice than other variables.
Normative work in economics and philosophy involves judgment under some
conditions of impartiality, which, in turn, is usually associated with consensus. By
establishing a relationship between consensus and conditions of impartiality, it is hoped
that this paper helps to lay an empirical foundation for welfare analysis and social choice
theory. That is, the aim is to identify views using a method that has normative appeal,
which can then inform prescriptive theories. By embedding the empirical analysis in real
world issues, I hope that this approach will also lead to practical policy applications,
including to contexts such as those described in the scenarios of this study.
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